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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellee ) BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
) SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
vs. ) 
) Case No. 920382-CA 
RONALD SCOTT LEAHY, ) 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the Judgment of the Honorable Sheila 
K. McCleve, Third Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
Utah, Salt Lake Department, against Appellant Leahy for the 
principal sum of $7. That judgment was the result of a trial de 
novo following an appeal by defendant/appellant from a Judgment 
against him in the Small Claims Department of the Third Circuit 
Court. 
Appellant has claimed jurisdiction of this Court under Rules 
3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and the Utah Constitution. Appellee challenges the 
jurisdiction of this Court under Article VIII, Section 2, and 
Article VIII, Section 5, Constitution of Utah, and Sections 78-2-
2(2),(3), 78-2a-3(2), 78-4-7.5 and 78-6-10(2) Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Does the Utah Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to hear 
appellant Leahy's appeal in this instance? 
2. Does Section 78-6-10(2) Utah Code Annotated 1953 violate 
any constitutional right of Appellant? 
3. Are Sections 12.56.530 and 12.56.560, Salt Lake City 
Code/ valid and constitutional enactments of a municipal entity 
within the State of Utah? 
4. Does this Court have jurisdiction to review the 
sufficiency of evidence for the Judgment below, and, if so, was 
sufficient evidence presented at the trial de novo in the Circuit 
Court to sustain the $7 judgment? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS/ 
STATUTES/ ORDINANCES/ RULES AND REGULATIONS 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment XIV, Section I: 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — 
Equal protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States
 f 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article Ir Section 7: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
2 
Article I, Section 11: 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
Article VIII, Section 2: 
Sec. 2. [Supreme court — Chief justice — Declaring 
law unconstitutional — Justice unable to 
participate.] 
The Supreme Court shall be the highest court and shall 
consist of at least five justices. . . . The court 
shall not declare any law unconstitutional under this 
constitution or the Constitution of the United States, 
except on the concurrence of a majority of all justices 
of the Supreme Court. . . . 
Article VIII, Section 5: 
Sec. 5 [Jurisdiction of district court and other 
courts — Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in 
all matters except as limited by this constitution or 
by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. 
The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as 
provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other 
courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided 
by statute. Except for matters filed originally with 
the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an 
appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction 
to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED 
Section 78-2-2(2), (3)(j)i 
Section 78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction 
3 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue 
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its 
jurisdiction, 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
* * * 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any 
court of record over which the Court of 
Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d): 
Section 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) Th€» Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
* * * 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a 
circuit court; 
Section 78-4-7.5: 
Section 78-4-7.5. Trials de novo. 
The circuit court has appellate jurisdiction to hear 
trials de novo of the judgments of the justices' courts 
and trials de novo of the small claims department of 
the circuit court. 
Section 78-6-1(1) (a)
 f (7): 
78-6-1. Creation — Jurisdiction — Biannual review -
- Counsel not necessary — Deferring multiple 
claims of one plaintiff — Supreme Court to 
govern procedures. 
(1) The circuit court shall and, if certified by the 
Judicial Council, the justice court may create a 
department known as the -Small Claims Department- which 
has jurisdiction in cases: 
4 
(a) for the recovery of money where the 
amount claimed does not exceed $2,000 
including attorney fees but exclusive of 
court costs and interest and where the 
defendant resides or the action of 
indebtedness was incurred within the 
jurisdiction of the court in which the action 
is to be maintained; . . . 
* * * 
(7) Small claims shall be managed in accordance with 
specified rules of procedure and evidence promulgated 
by the Supreme Court. 
Section 78-6-10 (1), (2), (3) (prior to 1988 amendment): 
Section 78-6-10 Conclusiveness of judgment — 
Jurisdiction for appeals. 
(1) The judgment of the small claims department of the 
justices' and circuit court is conclusive upon the 
plaintiff unless a counterclaim has been interposed. 
(2) If the matter is heard in the small claims 
department of the circuit court, the defendant may 
appeal the judgment of the circuit court to the Court 
of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal within five 
days of the entry of the judgment against him. 
(3) If the matter is heard in the small claims 
department of the justices' court, the defendant may 
obtain a trial de novo in the circuit court by filing 
in the circuit court of the county a petition for trial 
de novo within five days of the entry of the judgment 
against him. 
Section 78-6-10(1)
 t (2) (following 1988 amendment): 
Section 78-6-10. Appeals — Who may take and 
jurisdiction. 
(1) Either party may appeal the judgment of the small 
claims department of the circuit or justices' court to 
the circuit court of the county by filing a notice of 
appeal within ten days of the notice of entry of the 
judgment. 
(2) The appeal to the circuit couort is a trial de novo 
and shall be tried in accordance with the procedures of 
5 
the small claims department, except a record of the 
trial shall be maintained. The trial de novo may not 
be heard by a small claims court judge pro tempore 
appointed under Section 78-6-1,5. The decision of the 
trial do novo may not be appealed unless the court 
holds a state statute or local ordinance 
unconstitutional. 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 3(a): 
Rule 3, Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An 
appeal may be taken from a district, juvenile, or 
circuit court to the appellate court with jurisdiction 
over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, 
except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice 
of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the 
time allowed by Rule 4. . . . 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 26(13)(a)i 
Rule 26. Appeals. 
(13) An appeal may be taken to the circuit court from 
a judgment rendered in the justice court under this 
rule, except: 
(a) the case shall be tried anew in the 
circuit court. The decision of the circuit 
court is final, except when the validity or 
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance 
is raised in the justice court; 
SALT LAKE CITY CODE 
Section 12.56.150 B, C: 
12.56.150 Parking meters — Installation. 
B. No person shall park any vehicle in any parking 
meter space, except as otherwise permitted by this 
6 
chapter, without immediately depositing in the parking 
meter contiguous to the space such lawful coin or coins 
of the United States as are required for such meter and 
designated by directions on the meter, and when 
required by the direction on the meter, setting in 
operation the timing mechanism thereof in accordance 
with said directions, unless the parking meter 
indicates at the time such vehicle is parked that an 
unexpired portion remains of the period for which a 
coin or coins has been previously deposited. 
C. No person, except as otherwise provided by this 
chapter, shall permit any vehicle parked by such person 
to remain parked in any parking meter space during any 
time when the parking meter contiguous to such space 
indicates that no portion remains of the period for 
which the last previous coin or coins has been 
deposited, or beyond the time limited for parking as 
designated on the meter. 
Section 12.56.530: 
12.56.530 Parking violation — Owner's responsibility. 
Whenever any vehicle shall have been parked in 
violation of any of the provisions of any ordinance 
prohibiting or restricting parking, the person in whose 
name such vehicle is registered shall be prima facie 
responsible for such violation and subject to the 
penalty therefor. 
Section 12.56.560: 
12.56.560 Unauthorized use of streets — Strict 
liability of owner. 
Whenever any vehicle shall have been employed in the 
unauthorized use of streets, the person in whose name 
such vehicle is registered shall be strictly liable for 
such unauthorized use and the penalty therefor. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On or about October 27, 1990 an automobile registered to 
Appellant Leahy was parked on the streets of Salt Lake City at a 
location where there was a parking meter. Due to expiration of 
7 
the time on the meter, a Salt Lake City official placed a civil 
parking notice on the vehicle. (Trial transcript ["Tr"], pages 
4 and 6) 
2. As a result of Appellant Leahy's failure to respond to 
said parking notice and to several additional notices mailed to 
the address indicated on his motor vehicle registration, (the 
same address as shown on Appellant's Notice of Appeal), Appellee 
Salt Lake City filed a Small Claims Affidavit in the Third 
Circuit Court of Utah, Salt Lake Department on March 10, 19 91 for 
a civil penalty of $47. The Small Claims Affidavit and Order 
were served upon Appellant Leahy on January 11, 1992. (Tr, p. 7; 
Record ["R"], documents 3 and 4) 
3. The said Affidavit stated that the subject vehicle had 
been parked in violation of Section 12.56.150, Salt Lake City 
Code, that at the time of said violation the vehicle was 
registered to Appellant Leahy, and that Leahy was liable to the 
City for being the owner of said vehicle in violation, as 
provided by Section 12.56.530 of the City's ordinances. (R, doc. 
3) 
4. A trial was held in the Small Claims Court on February 
26, 1992, at which Appellant Leahy was present. Plaintiff Salt 
Lake City presented evidence that the subject vehicle had been 
parked in violation of the City's parking ordinances and that the 
registered owner of the vehicle was Defendant Leahy as of the 
date of the violation. (Brief of Appellant, p. 6) 
5. Defendant Leahy challenged the constitutionality of Salt 
8 
Lake City ordinances 12.56.150 and 12.56.530. The Small Claims 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the said ordinances and 
rendered judgment against Defendant Leahy for the principal sum 
of $47 plus $26 court costs and $45 attorney's fees, for a total 
judgment of $118. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 6, 9) 
6. Defendant Leahy appealed the Small Claims Court judgment 
to the Third Circuit Court, and a trial de novo was held on April 
22, 1992 before the Honorable Sheila K. McCleve. Plaintiff Salt 
Lake City again presented evidence of the violation of the 
subject vehicle and of Defendant Leahy's being the registered 
owner of said vehicle at the time of violation. (Tr, pp. 5, 6) 
7. Defendant Leahy chose not to present any evidence 
whatsoever, including any evidence that the subject vehicle had 
not been over-parked or that he was not the registered owner of 
that vehicle at the time of violation. (Tr, at pp. 20, 21) 
8. Once again Defendant Leahy challenged the 
constitutionality of the aforementioned ordinances and the 
sufficiency of the evidence against him. He did not challenge 
Section 78-6-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 before the Circuit 
Court. (Tr, pp. 22-24) 
9. Salt Lake City argued that Section 12.56.560, Salt Lake 
City Code, imposed strict liability upon Defendant Leahy and that 
a prima facie case had been made against him under Section 
12.56.530, Salt Lake City Cede. (Tr, pp. 21-23) 
10. The Circuit Court found Salt Lake City Ordinances 
12.56.130 and 12.56.530 to be constitutional and entered judgment 
9 
against Defendant Leahy for the principal sum of $7 plus costs. 
(Tr, pp. 25-27) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Utah Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear 
Appellant Leahy's appeal. Utah Code Annotated Section 7 8-6-10 
provides that the decision of the Circuit Court in a trial de 
novo following an appeal from the Small Claims Court may not be 
appealed unless the Circuit Court holds a State statute or local 
ordinance unconstitutional. In this instance the lower court 
found no State statute or local ordinance unconstitutional. 
2. The state statute and municipal ordinances challenged by 
Appellant are entitled under the law to a presumption of validity 
and constitutionality. The burden of proof is on Appellant to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt their invalidity. 
3. Appellant did not challenge Section 78-6-10 in either of 
the courts bellow and is precluded from raising said challenge for 
the first time on appeal to this Court. Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-6-10 does not deprive Appellant of his due process 
rights nor his right to seek redress through the Court under the 
Utah Constitution. Just as not all matters are appealable to the 
Supreme Court, not all matters are appealable to the Court of 
Appeals. The purposes of the abbreviated procedures with respect 
to the Small Claims Court is to relieve the workload upon the 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and to allow those 
X0 
appellate courts to concentrate on areas of complexity. 
4. Salt Lake City ordinances 12.56.530 and 12.56.560 were 
adopted pursuant to power granted by the Utah Legislature. The 
trial court's judgment against Appellant is presumed correct and 
Appellant carries the burden of overcoming this presumption. 
5. Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.56.530 is a legislative 
recognition of a common-law inference drawn from proven facts. 
It is a civil parking ordinance, identical to the Chicago, 
Illinois ordinance which was upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court 
and approved by several other states. It does not violate 
Appellant's due process rights, but simply shifts the burden to 
the Defendant to go forward with proof. Under the rationcile of 
the Illinois court it imposes strict and vicarious liability on 
the owner of an illegally parked vehicle. 
6. Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.56.560 expressly imposes 
strict liability upon the registered owner of an automobile which 
is parked in violation of the City's ordinances. Strict 
liability ordinances have long been recognized in the law, 
particularly in regulatory measures where the mala prohibitum 
emphasis of the ordinance is upon the achievement of some social 
betterment rather than the punishment of crimes, as in cases of 
offenses mala In se. Such strict liability is recognized under 
Utah statutory law (Section 76-2-102 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as 
amended) and Utah decisional law. 
7. This Court has no jurisdiction to review the sufficiency 
of evidence of the Circuit Court's judgment, which acted as an 
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appellate court from the Small Claims Court. However, the trial 
transcript establishes that there was sufficient evidence 
presented at the trial de novo to sustain the judgment of the 
Circuit Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS LACKS JURISDICTION IN 
THIS MATTER. 
A. APPELLANT FAILED TO GIVE NOTICE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL. 
Appellant has challenged the validity of a State statute 
herein: Section 78-6-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
However, Appellant has failed to serve a copy of this proceeding 
upon the Utah Attorney General. Section 7 8-33-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, requires that 
. . . if a statute or state franchise or permit is 
alleged to be invalid the Attorney General shall be 
served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to 
be heard. 
See Hemenway & Moser v. Funk, 106 P.2d 779 (Utah 1940). This 
required notice is a condition precedent to Appellant going 
forward in the instant appeal, and this Court lacks jurisdiction 
to consider this matter in the absence of proof of such 
notification having been given. 
B. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER APPELLANT'S CHALLENGE TO 
STATE STATUTE SECTION 78-6-10 SINCE THIS CHALLENGE IS RAISED FOR 
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL HERE. 
Defendant/Appellant Leahy does not allege, and there is no 
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record or transcript to show, that he challenged the validity or 
constitutionality of Section 78-6-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, before the Small Claims Court. (Brief of Appellant, 
p. 6.) Neither does Leahy allege, nor does the transcript of the 
de novo trial show, any challenge to the said State statute 
before the Circuit Court of appeal from the Small Claims Court. 
(Tr., pp. 22-24.) Defendant/Appellant is precluded from raising 
a challenge to a statute which is raised for the first time 
before this Court of Appeals. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 
788 P.2d 513 (Utah 1990); State v. Matus, 789 P.2d 304 (Utah App. 
1990). 
C. UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ONLY 
THAT APPELLATE AUTHORITY GRANTED IT BY STATE STATUTE. THERE IS 
NO STATUTE WHICH GRANTS THIS COURT JURISDICTION TO HEAR 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S APPEAL HEREIN. 
It is Appellee Salt Lake City's contention that the Utah 
Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this 
instance. This Court was created by State statute and has only 
such jurisdiction as is granted by statute. Article VIII of the 
Utah Constitution provides for a Supreme Court (Article VIII 
Section 3), a District Court (Article VIII Section 5), and states 
that: 
The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and 
appellate, shall be provided by statute except for 
matters filed originally with the Supreme Court, there 
shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court 
or original jurisdiction to a court with appellate 
jurisdiction over the cause. Article VIII Section 5. 
(Empha sis added.) 
In a matter filed in the Small Claims Court, that Court is 
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the Court of original jurisdiction, and the initial trial is 
conducted before that Court: 
78-6-1. Creation — Jurisdiction — Biannual review -
- Counsel not necessary — Deferring multiple 
claims of one plaintiff — Supreme Court to 
govern procedures. 
(1) The circuit court shall and, if certified by the 
Judicial Council, the justice court may create a 
department known as the "Small Claims Department" which 
has jurisdiction in cases: 
(a) for the recovery of money where the 
amount claimed does not exceed $2,000 
including attorney fees but exclusive of 
court costs and interest and where the 
defendant resides or the action of 
indebtedness was incurred within the 
jurisdiction of the court in which the action 
is to be maintained; . . . 
• * * 
(7) Small claims shall be managed in accordance with 
simplified rules of procedure and evidence promulgated 
by the Supreme Court. 
Section 76-6-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended. 
An appeal from the judgment of the Small Claims Court is to 
the Circuit Court of the County in which the Small Claims 
Department is located. Rather than simply being an appeal on 
matters of law and sufficiency of evidence for the judgment 
below, the appellant from the Small Claims Court is entitled to a 
trial de novo to present the same, or additional facts, as those 
presented below, and to present the same or additional legal 
arguments and to challenge the constitutionality of ordinances 
and statutes. Section 78-6-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides 
that: 
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(1) Either party may appeal the judgment of the small 
claims department of the circuit or justices' court to 
the circuit court of the county by filing a notice of 
appeal within ten days of the notice of entry of the 
judgment. 
(2) The appeal to the circuit court is a trial de novo 
and shall be tried in accordance with the procedures of 
the small claims department, except a record of the 
trial shall be maintained. The trial de novo may not 
be heard by a small claims court judge pro tempore 
appointed under Section 78-6-1.5. The decision of the 
trial de novo may not be appealed unless the court 
holds a state statute or local ordinance 
unconstitutional. 
As is provided in the aforementioned Section 78-6-10, the 
decision of the trial de novo may not be appealed unless the 
Court holds a State statute or local ordinance unconstitutional. 
By statute, the Circuit Court acts as an appellate court for all 
appeals from the Small Claims Department and is the court of last 
resort provided by statute unless an ordinance or statute is 
found unconstitutional. 
The circuit court has appellate jurisdiction to hear 
trials de novo of the judgments of the justices' courts 
and trials de novo of the small claims department of 
the circuit court. 
Section 78-4-7.5. See City of Monticello v. Christensenf 788 
P.2d 513 (Utah 1990) and State v. Matus, 789 P.2d 304 (Utah App. 
1990). 
Appeals from final civil judgments of the Circuit Courts are 
to the Court of Appeals (Section 78-4-11). The jurisdiction of 
the Court of Appeals is set forth at Section 78-2a-3, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 as amended, which provides, inter alia: 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
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* "k ie 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a 
circuit court: 
(Empha sis added.) 
There is no provision in the State statutes for the Court of 
Appeals to hear a challenge to the constitutionality of a State 
statute or a municipal ordinance where the challenge was raised, 
or could have been raised, in the Small Claims Court, and again 
in the Circuit Court acting as an appellate court, where no 
statute or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional. For 
these reasons, the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear 
this case, and the appeal should be dismissed. 
POINT II 
STATE STATUTES AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES ARE 
ENTITLED TO A PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY AND 
CONSTITUTIONALITY. EVERY REASONABLE 
CONSTRUCTION WILL BE UTILIZED TO RENDER A 
LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT AND ITS CLASSIFICATIONS 
VALID. THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE 
CHALLENGER TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
THE INVALIDITY OF THE ORDINANCE OR STATUTE. 
Appellant Leahy has challenged the constitutionality of a 
State statute, Section 78-6-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, for the 
first time on this appeal. He also challenged two Salt Lake City 
Ordinances, Sections 12.56.530 and 12.56.560, Salt Lake City 
Code. 
State statutes, as well as municipal ordinances, are 
presumptively valid. Courts will indulge in every reasonable 
construction to render the legislative act valid and 
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constitutional. Professor McQuillin, in his respected treatise 
on municipal corporation, has stated: 
No ordinance or law will be declared unconstitutional 
unless clearly so, and every reasonable [effort] will 
be made to sustain it. Not only must 
unconstitutionality appear clear, but, it has been 
asserted, it must appear and be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt . . . If the constitutional questions 
raised are fairly debateable, the court must declare 
the ordinance constitutional, as the court cannot and 
must not substitute its judgment for that of the local 
legislative body. 
5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §19.06 at pp. 377-78 (3rd 
Ed.Rev.); see also, JEcl. §19.14. 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue as follows: 
It is well settled in this state, as elsewhere, that 
the courts will not declare a statute unconstitutional 
unless it clearly and manifestly violates some 
provision of the constitution of the United States. 
Every presumption must be indulged in favor of the 
constitutionality of an act, and every reasonable doubt 
resolved in favor of its validity. (Citations omitted) 
The whole burden lies on him who denies the 
constitutionality of a legislative enactment. 
State v. Packer, 297 P. 1013, 1016 (Utah, 1931). See also, State 
v. Packard, 250 P. 2d 561 (Utah, 1952). (Emphasis added.) 
This rule of construction has been emphasized more recently 
by the Court, which held: 
It [a city ordinance] should not be held to be invalid 
unless it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt to be 
incompatible with some particular constitutional 
provision. 
Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035, 1037 (Utah, 1975), cert. 
den. 425 U.S. 915, 47 L.Ed.2d 766 (authorities omitted, emphasis 
added). See also, City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 
513 (Utah 1990) . 
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POINT III. 
SECTION 78-6-10, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 
VIOLATES NO LEGALLY PROTECTED RIGHT OF 
APPELLANT UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
A. THE STATUTE DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS. 
Appellant claims that since the plaintiff may choose the 
Small Claims Court as the forum in which to commence legal action 
(where the amount in controversy is within the Small Claims 
Court's jurisdiction), and that since the only appeal from a 
decision of a trial de novo in the Circuit Court is where the 
Court holds a State statute or local ordinance unconstitutional, 
Section 78-6-10 Utah Code Annotated 1953 unconstitutionally 
deprives defendants in small claims actions of seeking redress 
protected under the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11, and 
deprives defendants of due process of law under Utah 
Constitution, Article I, Section 7. 
Appellant, despite his burden of proving the statute 
unconstitutional in the face of a presumption of validity, cites 
only one case in support of his proposition: Liedtke v. 
Schettler, 649 P.2d 80 (Utah 1982). However, that case is 
inapposite for a number of reasons. First, it did not address 
either the issue of open access to the courts under Article I, 
Section 11 or due process of law under Article I, Section 7. 
Rather it addressed the issue of whether former Section 78-6-10 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 was in violation of Article I, Section 
24, Utah Constitution that all laws of a general nature shall 
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have uniform operation. 
At the time of the Liedtke decision, (prior to the 1988 
amendment), Section 78-6-10 provided that plaintiffs may appeal 
to the District Court only from Small Claims Court judgments 
granted on a counterclaim, if such was asserted by defendants. 
The judgment on plaintiffs' own Complaints were conclusive upon 
them. Defendants were afforded an appeal from any judgment. The 
Court held that that statute did not violate the constitutional 
requirement that all laws of a general nature have uniform 
operation. 
Although Appellant Leahy has not challenged the current 
Section 78-6-10 (as amended in 1988) under Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 24, generally considered the equivalent of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, it would certainly withstand such a challenge. As 
stated in the Liedtke case, 
The small claims courts were established as separate 
departments of justice of the peace courts and circuit 
courts in this state for the purpose of providing 
speedy adjudication of money claims not exceeding $400 
[since increased to $2,000]• Sections 78-6-1, et seq., 
provide expedited procedure, reduced filing fees, and 
informal presentation of evidence and witnesses in 
small claims courts, so that the fees for an attorney 
may be avoided. 
Liedtke v. Schettler, 649 P.2d 80, 81 (Utah 1982). 
The Court then went on to state that: 
Statutes which treat classes of citizens differently do 
not offend equal protection guarantees unless the 
classification and different treatment bear no rational 
relationship to the objective of the legislation. 
The Court found that the differing rights of appeal between 
19 
plaintiffs and defendants, established by the statute, bore a 
rational relationship to the objective of the legislation - the 
speedy adjudication of small claims: 
Under §78-6-11, an appeal by plaintiff from an adverse 
judgment on his own complaint would afford plaintiff a 
trial de novo — thus two choices of forum — and would 
entirely defeat the objective of speedy adjudication of 
small claims. We do not find it to be unreasonable, 
nor a denial of equal protection, for the legislature 
to deny plaintiff two such bites of the apple. 
Liedtke, supra at 82. 
The limitation complained of by the plaintiff in the Liedtke 
case has been eliminated by current statutes which allow an 
appeal by either the plaintiff or defendant from any Small Claims 
Court judgment for a trial de novo in the Circuit Court. 
Appellant Leahy, however, contends that the present statute which 
limits appeals from the Circuit Court to the Court of Appeals to 
appeals from judgments finding a statute or ordinance 
unconstitutional benefits the plaintiff to the detriment of the 
defendant since 
[i]t is difficult to imagine a case in which a 
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute or 
ordinance would be asserted, in a small claims matter, 
except as a defense to a claim. 
Brief of Appellant p. 8. 
In fact, a plaintiff in a small claims action has as much 
right as a defendant to challenge the constitutionality of a 
statute or ordinance in attempting to obtain redress in matters 
within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court. Whichever 
litigant challenges the constitutionality of the statute or 
ordinance has its first bite at the apple in the small claims 
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proceeding. If the statute or ordinance is upheld by the Small 
Claims Court, that same litigant has a second bite at the apple 
before the Circuit Court. Neither the plaintiff nor the 
defendant is treated differently, so there is not even an issue 
of equal protection of the laws. 
However, even if it is the case that the defendant is more 
likely to challenge the constitutionality of a statute or 
ordinance than a plaintiff, the defendant still has two bites at 
the apple, either (1) in the Small Claims Court and in the 
Circuit Court if the matter is initially filed in the Small 
Claims Court, or (2) in the Circuit Court and the Court of 
Appeals if the matter is originally filed in the Circuit Court.1 
The plaintiff's two bites at the apple come in his appeal to the 
Circuit Court and his appeal to the Court of Appeals. 
Applying the rationale of the Liedtke case, this statute's 
treatment of classes of citizens differently does not offend 
equal protection guarantees since the classification and 
different treatment bear a rational relationship to the objective 
of the legislation, which is speedy adjudication of relatively 
minor monetary claims, providing expedited procedure, reducing 
filing fees, and allowing for informal presentation of evidence 
and witnesses, so that fees for an attorney may be avoided. 
There are numerous examples under Utah law of different 
lThe Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction from all 
appeals from the Circuit Courts, except those from the Small 
Claims Department of the Circuit Court. Section 78-2a-3(2)(d), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
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treatment of classes of citizens in the Courts. These include 
limitations on appeals to the Supreme Court where appeals are 
provided by statute to other appellate courts. The purposes of 
these limitations include relieving the Supreme Court of an 
excessive workload and allowing it to concentrate on particular 
areas of complexity and greater moment. This different treatment 
of classes of citizens likewise does not offend equal protection 
guarantees since the classification and different treatment bear 
a rational relationship to the objective of the legislation. 
In addition, a defendant objecting to a finding of 
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance by a trial de novo in 
the Circuit Court may petition the Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari. Further, if this Court of Appeals has authority, 
which Appellee denies, to hear the instant matter, this present 
appeal is an example of a right of appeal which Defendant Leahy 
has, despite the supposed limitations imposed by Section 78-6-
10.2 
2In an earlier case, the Utah Supreme Court held Section 78-
6-10 U.C.A. 1953, in its earlier form, to be constitutional 
against an equal protection challenge, saying: 
The Small Claims Court is totally a creature of 
statute. Given its nature and purpose it is not 
unreasonable for the legislature to provide a different 
time for taking an appeal from the Small Claims Court, 
from that provided for appeals from other courts. 
Defendant as an appellant from a Small Claims Court has 
been given a reasonable time within which to take an 
appeal. He finds himself within a reasonable 
classification. 
Larson Ford Sales, Inc. v. Silver, 551 P.2d 233 (Utah 1976). 
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B. THE STATUTE DOES NOT VIOLATE APPELLANT'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO OPEN ACCESS TO THE COURTS. 
Appellant Leahy has utterly failed to meet his burden of 
showing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Section 78-6-10 is 
violative of the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 11, since he has cited no cases or other 
authority for his position. 
An extensive discussion by the Utah Supreme Court of the 
meaning, history, and applicability of Utah Constitution Article 
I, Section 11, and its relationship to other constitutional 
sections, was set forth in the case of Berry v. Beech, 111 P. 2d 
670 (Utah 1985) • The Court stated that a plain reading of 
Section 11 establishes that the framers of the Constitution 
intended that an individual could not be arbitrarily deprived of 
effective remedies designed to protect basic individual rights. 
Berry, supra at 675. In analyzing the relationship between 
Section 11 and other constitutional provisions the Court stated: 
The meaning of Section 11 must be taken not only from 
its history and plain language, but also from its 
functional relationship to other constitutional 
provisions. Section 11 and the Due Process Clause of 
Article I, Section 7 are related both in their 
historical origins and to some extent in their 
constitutional functions, to a degree, the two 
provisions are complementary and even overlap, but they 
are not wholly duplicative. 
Berry, supra at 675. The Court then went on to analyze the open 
courts provision: 
Specifically, neither the due process nor the open 
courts provision constitutionalizes the common-law or 
otherwise freezes the law governing private rights and 
remedies as of the time of statehood. . . . Once a 
cause of action under a particular rule of law accrues 
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to a person by virtue of an injury to his rights, that 
person's interest in the cause of action and the law 
which is the basis for a legal action becomes vested, 
and a legislative repeal of the law cannot 
constitutionally divest the injured person of the right 
to litigate the cause of action to a judgment. . . . 
On the other hand, Section 11 rights are not always 
paramount, either. They do not sweep all other 
constitutional rights and prerogatives before them. 
They, too, like many constitutional rights, must be 
weighed against and harmonized with other 
constitutional provisions. The accommodation of 
competing, and sometimes clashing, constitutional 
rights and prerogatives is a task of the greatest 
delicacy, although a common and necessary one in 
constitutional adjudication. For example, the right to 
protection of a person's reputation must be 
accommodated to the right of others to speak freely. 
Berry, supraf at pp. 676, 677. (Footnotes deleted.) 
The Berry Court announced a two part test in determining 
whether Section 11 rights and the prerogative of the legislature 
are properly accommodated: 
First, Section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an 
injured person an effective and reasonable alternative 
remedy "by due course of law" for vindication of his 
constitutional interest. The benefit provided by the 
substitute must be substantially equal in value or 
other benefit to the remedy abrogated in providing 
essentially comparable substantive protection to one's 
person, property or reputation, although the form of 
the substitute remedy may be different. . . . 
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative remedy 
provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of action 
may be justified only if there is a clear social or 
economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination of 
an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or 
unreasonable means for achieving the objective. 
Berry, supra, at p. 680. 
Section 78-6-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, prior to its 
1988 amendment, provided for an appeal mechanism whereby the 
judgment of the Small Claims Department of the Circuit Court was 
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conclusive upon the plaintiff unless a counterclaim had been 
interposed. A defendant could appeal the judgment of the Small 
Claims Court to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal 
within five days of the entry of judgment against him. The 1988 
amendments to Section 78-6-10 modified the rights of appeal to 
the Circuit Court by providing for a trial de novo by either 
party and extended the time for filing a notice of appeal to ten 
days after the notice of entry of judgment. The provision for an 
appeal from the Circuit Court to the Court of Appeals where a 
State statute or local ordinance was found unconstitutional was a 
new right added by the legislature which was not found in the 
statute prior to the 1988 amendment. 
Applying the analysis of the Berry Court, the Section 11 
open courts provision was satisfied by the 1988 amendments 
because the new law provided an injured person with an effective 
and reasonable alternative remedy "by due course of law," for 
vindication of his constitutional interests which was 
"substantially equal in value or other benefit to the remedy 
abrogated in providing essentially comparable substantive 
protection to one's person, property, or reputation, although the 
form of the substitute remedy may be different." Berry, supra, 
at p. 680. 
C. THE STATUTE DOES NOT VIOLATE APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS. 
Again, appellant's challenge of the subject statute on due 
process grounds must fail since he has failed to meet his burden, 
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beyond a reasonable doubt, of showing the unconstitutionality of 
the statute under Utah Constitution Article I, Section 7. 
With respect to that constitutional section, the Utah 
Supreme Court has explained the due process guarantee as follows: 
[N]eith€sr a court nor other judicial tribunal may deny 
a person a constitutional right or deprive such person 
of a vested interest in property without any 
opportunity to be heard. To do so constitutes taking 
of property without due process of law. 
Many attempts have been made to further define "due 
process'" but they all resolve into the thought that a 
party shall have his day in court — that is each party 
shall have the right to a hearing before a competent 
court, with the privilege of being heard and 
introducing evidence to establish his cause or his 
defense, after which comes judgment upon the record 
thus made. 
Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 316 (1945) cited in 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 657 P.2d 
1293, 1296 (1982). 
The due process rights provided to Appellant Leahy under 
Section 78-6-10 include the right to a trial in the Small Claims 
Court, with the privilege confronting and cross-examining 
witnesses, being heard and introducing evidence to establish his 
defense, together with all other privileges appertaining to that 
proceeding. He has the right to appeal that judgment to the 
Circuit Court and to have a trial de novo, again with all the 
privileges appertaining thereto, and he has the right to appeal 
to the Court of Appeals from judgment finding a State statute or 
local ordinance to be unconstitutional. In a very real sense, it 
may be said that he has had his "day in court" twice. The fact 
that he may not further appeal if a State statute or local 
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ordinance is not found unconstitutional in no way deprives him of 
his day in court and in no way deprives him of his due process 
rights under the Utah Constitution. 
POINT IV. 
THE SUBJECT MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES WERE VALIDLY 
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO POWER GRANTED BY THE UTAH 
LEGISLATURE. 
In 19 52, the Utah Supreme Court held that the City of Ogden 
did not have either the express or implied power to make the 
registration of an illegally parked vehicle prima facie evidence 
that the owner committed or authorized the violation. City of 
Qgden v. Nasfell, 349 P. 2d 507 (Utah 1952). However, this 
holding was based upon the Dillon Rule, that is, "any fair, 
reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of the 
power is resolved by the courts against the corporation (city) 
and the power denied ..." 249 P.2d at 508, citing 1 Dillon 
Municipal Corp., 5th Ed., p. 448, §237. 
The Utah Supreme court strongly repudiated the Dillon Rule 
in State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (1980). In Hutchinson, the 
court upheld a county ordinance based on Section 17-5-77 U.C.A. 
(1953), which granted counties the authority to enact all 
necessary measures to promote the general health, safety, morals, 
and welfare of their citizens. The Court found that the 
Legislature had made a similar grant of power to the cities, 
citing Section 10-8-84, U.C.A., (1953): 
They may pass all ordinances and rules, and make all 
regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for 
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carrying into effect or discharging all powers and 
duties confirmed by this chapter, such as are necessary 
and proper to provide for the safety and preserve the 
health, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, 
peace and good order, comfort and convenience of the 
city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the 
protection of property therein . . . 
(Emphasis added. ) 
Whether that authority extended to the enactment of a strict 
liability ordinance was answered by Salt Lake City v. Ronnenburg, 
674 P.2d 128 (Utah 1983), where an ordinance imposing strict 
criminal liability upon a tavern owner for permitting an underage 
person to come upon tavern premises was upheld. 
In upholding the county ordinance based on the general 
welfare provision, the court in Hutchinson utilized a parallel 
analysis to City ordinances. See, e.g., 624 P.2d at 1122, 
wherein the Court noted that "charter cities have been endowed 
with even more wide ranging powers. . • .," and the "grant of 
general welfare power to counties is duplicated by a similar 
grant to the cities, and this Court has on several occasions 
squarely sustained City ordinances solely on the basis of the 
general welfare clause." Citations omitted. In abrogating the 
Dillon Rule, the Court further explained that ,T[b]road 
construction of the powers of counties and cities is consistent 
with the current needs of local governments." 624 P.2d at 1126. 
In addition to the general welfare grant, the state has also 
made specific grants of power which "should generally be 
construed with reasonable latitude in light of the broad language 
of the general welfare clause which may supplement the power 
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found in a specific delegation." Hutchinson, supra, at 1126. 
Section 41-6-17(a)(1) U.C.A. (1953) grants local authorities the 
power to regulate or prohibit stopping, standing, or parking. 
Section 10-8-11 allows cities to "regulate the use of streets, 
alleys, avenues, sidewalks, crosswalks, parks, and public 
grounds. . . ." 
Further expanding the cities' power to enact ordinances is 
Section 10-3-702, which provides: 
[A municipality] may pass any ordinance to regulate, 
require, prohibit, govern, control or supervise any 
activity, business, conduct or condition authorized by 
this act or any other provision of law. . . . [The 
municipality] may prescribe a minimum penalty for the 
violation of any municipal ordinance and may impose a 
civil penalty for the unauthorized use of a municipal 
property, including" but not limited to, the use of 
parks, streets, and other public grounds or equipment. 
Rules of civil procedure shall be substantially 
followed. 
The fact that Salt Lake City ordinances 5.56.530 and 
5.56.560 are civil ordinance, imposing civil penalties, is a 
further argument in the City's favor. Whereas the ordinance in 
Nasfell was a criminal ordinance the standard of proof of which 
was "beyond a reasonable doubt,M under Salt Lake City's parking 
program the maximum penalty for over-parking is $47 (Trial 
transcript, at page 8), and the standard of proof is a 
"preponderance of evidence." Nasfell is not controlling both 
because it has been judicially repudiated and because it is 
inapposite. 
It is clear that pursuant to Hutchinson and state enabling 
statutes, the City has the power to adopt the above ordinances. 
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POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANT 
IS PRESUMED CORRECT AND APPELLANT CARRIES THE 
BURDEN 'OF OVERCOMING THIS PRESUMPTION. 
Two classes of presumptions apply in this action. The first 
are legal presumptions. When a criminal defendant is given a 
fair opportunity to present his case, all presumptions favor the 
validity of the trial court judgment. State v. Seymour, 417 P.2d 
655 (Utah, 1966). 
The trial court rendered a civil judgment against appellant. 
That judgment is likewise presumed valid. The effect of such 
presumption is to place the burden of showing error or prejudice 
on the appellant who seeks to upset the trial court judgment. 
State v. Hamilton, 419 P.2d 770 (Utah, 1966). 
Thus, on appeal, all legal presumptions support the trial 
court judgment. Appellee will demonstrate, further, that the 
factual presumption which the trial court applied is in all 
respects constitutionally supportive of the judgment against 
appellant. 
POINT VI. 
A COMMON LAW PARKING PRESUMPTION EXISTS, 
INDEPENDENT OF ENABLING STATUTES OR LOCAL 
ORDINANCES. IT IS NOT A PRESUMPTION OF LAW, 
BUT IS AN INFERENCE DRAWN FROM PROVEN FACTS. 
AS SUCH, IT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE COURTS 
OF THIS COUNTRY FOR NEARLY HALF A CENTURY. 
Section 12.56.530, Salt Lake City Code/ provides for prima 
facie responsibility of a person in whose name a vehicle is 
registered whenever such vehicle is parked in violation of the 
provisions of any ordinance prohibiting or restricting parking. 
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Unlike the presumptions of law applicable on appeal (discussed 
under Point V), the factual presumption established by Section 
12.56.530 and applied by the trial court is not a presumption in 
a precise sense. It is merely an inference drawn from facts 
established by proof in the case: 
Presumptions are generally grouped into two major 
classes — presumptions of law and presumptions of 
fact. These are sometimes referred to, respectively as 
legal and natural presumptions. Presumptions of fact 
are, in their nature, inferences. 
29 Am.Jur.2d 160. 
Factual presumptions are therefore merely inferences drawn 
from proven facts. Their basis is experience and reason: 
A presumption of fact — which is the same as, or akin 
to, an inference — is a logical and reasonable 
conclusion of the existence of a fact in a case, not 
presented by direct evidence as to the existence of the 
fact itself, but inferred from the establishment of 
other facts from which, by the process of logic and 
reason, based upon human experience, the existence of 
the assumed fact may be concluded by the trier of the 
fact. A presumption of fact, or inference, is nothing 
more than a probable or natural explanation of facts, 
is at best a mere argument, and does not estop a party 
from proving his case by competent evidence. A 
presumption of this kind arises from the commonly 
accepted experiences of mankind and the inferences 
which reasonable men would draw from experiences. In 
those instances where one fact is proved or ascertained 
and another fact is its uniform concomitant, such other 
fact is presumed or inferred, without other proof, 
because of the uniform experience concerning the 
connection between the two facts. Evidence of the 
inherent capacity and strong tendency of something to 
cause an event is ordinarily evidence that the event 
did so result therefrom. 
29 Am.Jur.2d, 161. 
Needless to say, it is the prerogative of the trier of 
fact — here the trial judge — to determine whether to apply a 
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presumption or inference of fact. On appeal, such inferences are 
presumed to be reasonable and are construed in a light most 
favorable to the State. State v. Erickson, 568 P.2d 751 (1977). 
For nearly half a century, there has existed a widely 
accepted judicial presumption to the effect that evidence of 
ownership and illegal parking is sufficient to support an 
inference that the owner parked the car. This presumption has 
repeatedly been held sufficient to sustain a conviction if the 
inference is not explained or refuted by other evidence.3 
3The following reported cases evidence early acceptance of 
this historic judicial presumption: 
1934 New York People v. Marchetti, 276 N.Y.S. 708 
1938 Kentucky Commonwealth v. Kroger, 122 S.W.2d 1006, 
1009 
1940 New York People v. Rubin, 31 N.E.2d 501 
1943 Illinois City of Chicago v. Crane, 49 N.E.2d 802, 
804 (quoted with approval from Kroger, 
supra.) 
1946 Rhode Island State v. Morgan, 48 A.2d 248, 249 
(Affirming conviction by an evenly 
divided court) 
Pennsylvania Commonwealth v. Smith, 60 Pa. D&C 520 
City of St. Louis v. Cook, 221 S.W.2d 
468, 470 (Common law presumption 
recognized but decided on other grounds) 
People v. Hildebrandt, 126 N.E.2d 377, 
49 A.L.R.2d 499 
People v. Avis Rent-A-Car Div., Cent. 
Taxicab Co., 206 N.Y.S.2d 400 
People v. Johnson, 228 N.Y.S.2d 527 
1947 
1949 
1955 
1960 
1962 
. 
Missouri 
New York 
New York 
New York 
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This common law presumption has been developed through the 
courts; accordingly, it exists independent of enabling statutes 
or local ordinances. 
With one erroneous exception/ no court under reported case 
law has ever refused to recognize this common law presumption. 
Occasionally courts question the power of local governments to 
adopt the presumption by ordinance. But because the presumption 
exists by virtue of the common law, the existence or non-
existence of local ordinance has had no legal effect on 
application of the presumption by the courts. 
Thirty years ago the Utah Supreme Court denied Ogden City 
authority to adopt an ordinance creating the prima facie parking 
presumption. Nasfell v. Ogden, 122 Utah 344, 249 P.2d 507 
(1952). It relied upon the Dillon rule of strict statutory 
construction to question Ogden's enabling authority. The Court's 
majority opinion did not address the existence of the 
longstanding judicial presumption. However, its existence* was 
specifically noted in Justice Crockett's dissenting opinion. 
For at least three decades since the Nasfell decision, Salt 
Lake City Courts (and their successor Circuit Courts) have 
continued to accept this common law rule of evidence and have 
40nly one case has ever refused to recognize this 
presumption. State v. Scogqin, 7 2 S.E.2d 54 (1952). The opinion 
was written under the misimpression that courts had refused to 
accept the presumption. The court's superficial research into 
the case law recognizing the judicial presumption was criticized 
in two strong dissents, citing the numerous cases overlooked in 
the majority opinion. The Court later upheld the validity of a 
legislative presumption to the same effect. State v. Rumfelt, 85 
S.E.2d 398 (1955). 
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utilized registered ownership as evidence to prima facie identify 
drivers of illegally parked vehicles. 
In the case here under appeal, the trial judge applied the 
ownership inference consistent with all applicable case law as 
well as with the City's ordinance which is a legislative 
recognition of that common law inference. The trial court is 
entitled to take judicial notice of common-law presumptions as 
well as codified presumptions (Rule 301, Utah Rules of Evidence). 
POINT VII• 
NEITHER THE COMMON LAW PARKING PRESUMPTION 
NOR THE PRESUMPTION CODIFIED IN APPELLEE'S 
PARKING ORDINANCE IS VIOLATIVE OF APPELLANT'S 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
Rarely, if ever, has a presumption as to parking liability 
similar to the one in question been ruled to violate 
constitutional due process.5 
5The following jurisdictions have upheld such presumptions 
(either judicial or legislatively enacted) when attacked on due 
process grounds: 
Illinois Supreme Court 1978 Chicago v. Hertz Commercial 
Leasing Corp., 375 N.E.2d 
1285, cert, denied, 439 U.S. 
929, 99 S.Ct. 315, 58 L.Ed. 
322 
Iowa Supreme Court 1976 Iowa City v. Nolan, 239 N.W.2d 
102 
Texas Court of Crim- 1975 Snell v. State, 518 S.W.2d 383 
inal Appeals 
Oregon Court of 1974 City of Portland v. Kirk, 518 
Appeals P.2d 665 
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The prevailing caselaw all upholds the constitutionality of 
parking presumptions. They are directly in point. They cire not 
contradicted in reported case law. Such is undoubtedly the 
reason Appellant cited no authorities whatsoever in his appeal 
brief in this case. 
The numerous cases upholding the constitutionality of the 
parking presumption are thoroughly buttressed by the latest U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions. Through a recent series of cases, the 
Supreme Court has defined the due process standard against which 
Oklahoma Court of Crim- 1969 Cantrell v. Oklahoma City, 454 
inal Appeals P.2d 676 
Missouri Court of Kansas City v. Howe, 416 
Appeals S.W.2d 683 
Texas Court of Crim- 1964 Stecher v. State, 383 S.W.2d 
inal Appeals 594 
Ohio Supreme Court 1960 City of Columbus, Ohio v. 
Webster, 164 N.E.2d 734 
Arkansas Supreme Court 1957 Red Top Driv-Ur-Self v. Potts, 
300 S.W.2d 261. 
New York County Court 1951 People v. Lang, 106 N.Y.S.2d 
829; see also People v. Rubin, 
supra' People v. Hildebrandt, 
supra; People v. Avis Rent-A-
Car Div., Cent. Taxicab Co., 
supra; People v. Johnson, 
supra 
Missouri Supreme Court 1949 City of St. Louis v. Cook, 221 
S.W.2d 468 
Califor- Superior Court 1940 People v. Biqman, 100 P. 2d 370 
nia 
Michigan Supreme Court 1938 People v. Kavne, 282 N.W. 248 
Massachu- Supreme Court 1934 Commonwealth v. Ober, 189 N.E. 
setts 601 
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presumptions are to be tested in criminal cases. Barnes v. 
United States, 412 U.S. 837, 37 L.Ed.2d 380, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 
(1973); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 24 L.Ed.2d 610, 90 
S.Ct. 642 (1970); Learv v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 23 L.Ed.2d 
57, 89 S.Ct. 1532 (1969); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 
15 L.Ed.2d 210, 86 S.Ct. 279 (1965); United States v. Gainey, 380 
U.S. 63, 13 L.Ed.2d 658, 85 S.Ct. 754 (1965); Tot v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 463, 87 L.Ed. 1519, 635 S.Ct. 1241 (1943). 
In Learv v. United States, supra, the Court summarized the 
constitutionality test as follows: 
The upshot of Tot, Gainey and Romano is, we think, that 
a criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as 
"irrationalM or "arbitrary" and hence unconstitutional, 
unless it can at least be said with substantial 
assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than 
not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to 
depend. 
Thus, the Leary Court concluded that an inference meets due 
process standards if it can at least be said with substantial 
assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow 
from the proved fact on which it is made to depend. This more-
likely-than-not standard has been adhered to in the subsequent 
cases of Turner and Barnes. 
In the Turner case, supra, the Court upheld a conviction for 
possession of illegally imported heroin. The defendant in that 
case was not shown to have had any knowledge whatsoever of the 
drug being illegally imported. The Court took notice of the fact 
that heroin is generally imported illegally into this country and 
upheld the inference that the defendant knew these drugs had been 
3S 
illegally imported. 
In the more recent case of Barnes v. United States, supra, 
the Court considered the constitutionality of instructing the 
jury that it may infer from defendant's unexplained possession of 
recently stolen mail, that he possessed the mail with knowledge 
that it was stolen. The Court held the inference also to be 
valid. 
Thus, in recent cases, due process requirements were met by 
showing a "more-likely-than-not" connection between the proven 
facts and the inferred fact. The Court did not fully define the 
constitutional test for inferences in criminal cases. It 
appears, however, to regard the "reasonable doubt" test as 
substantially equivalent"to the due process standard. The Court 
in Barnes states: 
To the extent that the "rational connection", "more 
likely than not," and "reasonable doubt" standards bear 
ambiguous relationships to one another, the ambiguity 
is traceable in large part to variations in language 
and focus rather than to differences of substance. 
Id. p. 843. 
In Barnes, two factors persuaded the Court that both the due 
process and reasonable doubt standards had met: first, that the 
inference was rooted in the common-law; and second, the 
probability of a relationship based upon "experience" and "common 
sense". Jld. at p. 845. 
The factors which persuaded the U.S. Supreme Court in Barnes 
are present in the instant case. The impressive historical 
acceptance of the traditional common-law presumption here in 
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question is detailed under Point III. The roots of that 
inference are half-a-century deep. In referencing the 
significance of such common-law acceptance, Barnes Court stated: 
This longstanding and consistent judicial approval of 
the [jury] instruction, reflecting accumulated common 
experience, provides strong indication that the 
instruction comports with due process. 
Id. at p. 844. 
Recent court decisions invalidating irrebuttable 
presumptions are not applicable here, since all presumptions 
referred to herein are fully rebuttable. 
Of course, the challenged parking inference is more than 
rooted in our accumulated case law experience. It is based upon 
both experience and good sense. In the present case, the 
challenged presumption only permitted the inference of 
responsibility from unexplained evidence of ownership and illegal 
parking. Defendant/Appellant Leahy failed to present any 
evidence whatsoever in rebuttal. (Trial transcript, pages 20, 21) 
On the basis of this evidence alone, common sense and experience 
tell us of a high probability that respondent was the driver of 
the vehicle. In the absence of some contrary explanation, such 
evidence was clearly sufficient to enable the trial court to find 
by a preponderance of evidence that petitioner was the vehicle 
driver. 
There is, of course, evidence of the high correlation 
between vehicle ownership and operation. The Supreme Court of 
Michigan found by survey taken on random dates, that in 87.6% of 
the cases where automobiles were parked in violation of the 
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ordinance, the owner of such automobile had, himself, committed 
the violation. In 8% of the cases, such violation had been 
committed by immediate members of the owner's family, and in 4.4% 
of such cases, the violation was committed by some other person. 
People v. Kavne, supra, at p. 249. 
The closeness of this relationship between the registered 
owner of an automobile and its operation is emphasized by the 
Court in People v. Biqman, supra: 
Relationship between the registered owner of an 
automobile and its operation is natural; if he is not 
the operator on any occasion that fact is directly 
within his knowledge and in the ordinary course of 
events can easily be proved with such certainty as 
almost entirely to exclude the possibility of a false 
conviction. The presumption we are dealing with is not 
a presumption which either creates a crime or 
establishes the fact that a crime has been committed. 
On the contrary it arises only after proof by competent 
evidence that an offense, including all essential 
elements thereof, has been committed by some person and 
that such offense has been committed by and through the 
use of an instrumentality which defendants has caused 
to be registered in the public records of the state in 
his name and which by virtue of such registration he is 
primarily, of all persons in the state, entitled to 
use. 
The closeness of this relationship, together with the need of the 
presumption for effective traffic enforcement, lead the Chief 
Justice of the Utah Supreme Court to support the 
constitutionality of the presumption here in question. Chief 
Justice Wolfe, in a concurring opinion in Nasfell v. Ogden City, 
supra, stated: 
I opine that an ordinance passed under State granted 
power which provides that a judicial tribunal having 
jurisdiction may find an owner or a person registered 
as owner of an automobile guilty of the charge of 
excess or illegal parking in a proscribed area when it 
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appears from the evidence that the car of such 
registered owner has been found to have been overparked 
or park€id in a proscribed area and such owner, after 
reasonable notice of the fact of such excess or 
proscribed parking, fails to bring forth satisfactory 
proof that he is not the owner, or if the owner, that 
such car was not overparked or was not parked in a 
proscribed area by him or at his direction is 
constitutional. 
While such procedure places upon an owner the 
obligation to free himself from a law imposed 
presumption of guilty arising from the fact that he 
appears in the records as the registered owner, I 
think, in the interests of traffic regulation, such 
presumption may be indulged without running afoul of 
constitutional objections respecting failure to accord 
due process. 
Thus, it appears universally, that the inference here in 
question satisfies the most stringent standards courts have 
applied in judging permissible criminal law inferences. These 
requirements are satisfied because the defendant is not precluded 
from rebutting any element of the substantive offense. 
If the standards are met in judging criminal law inferences, 
they certainly are met in judging civil law inferences such as 
are present in the instant case. 
POINT VIII 
SALT LAKE CITY'S CIVIL PARKING ORDINANCE, 
SECTION 12.56.530, PATTERNED AFTER A CHICAGO 
ORDINANCE, VALIDLY IMPOSES STRICT AND VICARIOUS 
LIABILITY UPON THE OWNER OF AN ILLEGALLY 
PARKED VEHICLE, REGARDLESS OF WHO PARKED IT. 
Salt Lake City's current civil parking ordinance, Section 
12.56.530, was enacted in 1986, several years after Hutchinson 
was decided. It was patterned after, and is identical to, a 
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Chicago ordinance which was upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court. 
City of Chicago v. Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp., (1978), 71 
111. 2d 333, 17 111. Dec. 1, 375 N.E. 2d 1285, cert, denied, 439 
U.S. 929, 99 S.Ct. 315, 58 L.Ed. 2d 322. In Hertz, the Court 
ruled that the ordinance imposes vicarious liability on a 
registered owner of a vehicle parking in violation with the 
result that proof that the vehicle was in possession of another 
at the time of violation is irrelevant to the substantive 
offense. The Court stated: 
The defendants vigorously argue that the plain meaning 
of the words "prima facie responsible" in the Chicago 
ordinance indicates that it was the municipality's 
clear intention to allow the registered owner to rebut 
the presumption that the vehicle was parked by the 
owner. The issue cannot be so facilely resolved. The 
words "prima facie" mean nothing more than "at first 
sight" or "so far as can be judged from the first 
disclosure" or "without more" . . . In its statutory 
context the words "prima facie" mean that the City has 
established its case against the registered owner by 
proving (1) the existence of an illegally parked 
vehicle, and (2) registration of that vehicle in the 
name of the defendant. Such proof constitutes a prima 
facie case against the defendant owner. There is no 
indication in the ordinance that the owner, to be 
presumed responsible for the violation, must be 
presumed to have been the person who parked the 
vehicle. In practice, the defendant, to absolve 
himself of responsibility, may show that the vehicle 
was not parked illegally or that he was not the 
registered owner of the vehicle at the time of the 
alleged violation. The defenses are limited, but the 
plain meaning of the ordinance admits of no more. 
. . . This unambiguous language imposes both strict and 
vicarious liability on the owner whenever his vehicle 
is illegally parked, irrespective of whether the owner 
was the person who parked the vehicle. 
Hertz, supra, at page 1288 (emphasis added) (citations deleted). 
The Court, in Hertz, made note of cases from three other 
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jurisdictions which had interpreted the words "prima facie 
responsible" in accord with the Hertz Court's interpretation. 
See City of Columbus.Ohio v. Webster, 170 Ohio St. 327, 328, 164 
N.E. 2d 734, 735 (Ohio 1960); Kansas City v. Hertz Corp., 499 
S.W. 2d 449, 452-453 (Mo. 1973); and Iowa City v. Nolan, 239 
N.W. 2d 102, 103 (Iowa 1976)- See also 60 ALR 4th 784, 872. 
The Hertz Court likewise upheld the ordinance against 
challenges, inter alia, that (1) it imposed an irrebuttable 
presumption in contravention of constitutional due process 
protections (the defendant is not precluded form rebutting either 
element of the substantive offense), and (2) that it denied 
defendants equal protection under the law. 
Therefore, under the Hertz rationale, Salt Lake City's 
ordinance 12.56.530 validly and constitutionally imposes strict 
and vicarious liability upon the owner of an illegally parked 
vehicle, regardless of who may have parked it. 
POINT IX. 
SALT LAKE CITY'S STRICT LIABILITY PARKING 
ORDINANCE DOES NOT DENY APPELLANT DUE 
PROCESS. SECTION 12.56.560 DOES NOT DENY 
APPELLANT DUE PROCESS. 
Appellant argues that Salt Lake City's Section 12.56.560, 
which holds a person in whose name a vehicle is registered which 
had been employed in the unauthorized use of Salt Lake City 
streets as strictly liable for such unauthorized use, is 
violative of his due process rights. 
Strict liability statutes and ordinances have long been 
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recognized in the law, particularly in regulatory measures, where 
the mala prohibitum emphasis of the law is upon the achievement 
of some social betterment rather than punishment of crimes, as in 
cases of mala in se. See Morissette v. United States of America, 
342 US 246, 96 L ed 288, 72 S Ct 240 (1952). 
One legal scholar has cited and classified a large number of 
cases applying the doctrine of "crimes without intent," and 
concludes that they fall roughly into subdivisions of: 
(1) illegal sales of intoxicating liquor, (2) sales of 
impure or adulterated food or drugs, (3) sales of 
misbranded articles, (4) violations of antinarcotic 
Acts, (5) criminal nuisances, (6) violations of traffic 
regulations, (7) violations of motor-vehicle laws, and 
(8) violations of general police regulation, passed for 
the safety, health or well-being of the community. 
(Emphasis added.) Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col L Rev 
55, 73, 84; referred to in Morissette, supra, footnote 20, at 96 
L ed 288, 300. 
As was noted in Point IV above, the Utah Supreme Court has 
upheld the authority of a municipality to enact an ordinance 
imposing strict criminal liability upon a tavern owner for 
permitting an underage person to come upon the tavern premises, 
even in the absence of proof of criminal intent. Ronnenburq, 
supra. 
With regard to the claim of a violation of due process, 
Appellee has addressed this issue under Point VIII above. The 
same rationale which was applied in the Hertz case is applicable 
here. That is, that since the defendant is not precluded from 
rebutting either element of the substantive offense (that he is 
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the owner of the vehicle or that the vehicle was not illegally 
parker), the constitutional requirement of procedural due process 
is satisfied. Hertz, supra, at page 1291. 
POINT X. 
PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS THE APPLICATION OF THE 
COMMON LAW PARKING INFERENCE AND 
THE ORDINANCES CHALLENGED BY APPELLANT. 
Parking enforcement is one of the lease glamorous but most 
critical of municipal functions. Its objectives are founded in 
public safety and welfare and in common courtesy. There are 
within every community persons who despise such laws and hold 
them as a butt of their humor. They repeatedly flout the 
interests of their fellow citizens by parking within crowded 
downtown traffic lanes, on high-speed expressways, across private 
driveways, near school crosswalks, or in emergency zones or 
handicapped parking areas. One need only read an occasional 
police accident report to realize the hazard and inconvenience 
posed to citizens by these drivers. 
Law enforcement is often the only means by which thoughtless 
and often anonymous parking violators are reminded of their 
obligations to others. Salt Lake City, of course, does not 
suggest that the violations by Defendant/Appellant in this 
particular action are as critical to public safety and welfare as 
certain other parking laws. But Defendant/Appellant's challenge 
to the historic parking presumption, and to the subject parking 
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ordinances, jeopardizes our entire parking enforcement program. 
As stated by the Court in People v. Biqman, 100 P.2d 370, 373: 
The great convenience to the state through operation of 
this presumption in the proof of identity of operators 
in cases of illegal parking on the thousands of miles 
of highways in the state or to the officers of a 
municipality in enforcing the laws within the more 
limited but still relatively extensive public streets 
therein, is readily apparent. It is a matter of common 
knowledge, of which we may take notice, that is would 
be, and has in fact been, impractical for a city the 
size of that wherein this prosecution arose (Los 
Angeles; and we do not doubt that the same is 
relatively true in municipalities throughout the state) 
to maintain a police force large enough to personally 
detect any substantial portion of vehicular parking law 
violators by observing them in the act of illegal 
parking or by discovering the illegally parked vehicle 
and awaiting the return of the absent operators. The 
extent of the convenience to the state, it seems 
apparent to us, will far outweigh such inconvenience as 
may be occasioned to some registered owners whose 
automobiles when used by others may be illegally parked 
and result in the owners having to appear and answer 
the charges. In such instances, however, except in the 
comparatively rare cases of stolen or unlawfully moved 
cars, the owners can protect themselves by permitting 
their automobiles to be used only by persons who will 
be responsible to them for any unlawful parking of the 
vehicles. In any event, the inconvenience is basically 
caused not by the operation of the presumption of 
identity of the operator but rather by the violation by 
the actual operator of the substantive law involved. 
In no way whatsoever does the operation of the 
presumption preclude the owner from his right to 
challenge the fact as to who did operate the vehicle. 
To strike down the parking presumption as unconstitutional 
may do more than destroy the foundation of the parking 
enforcement program of every major city within the court's 
jurisdiction. Should courts begin to require new and burdensome 
tests for factual presumptions, vast areas of law enforcement 
generally may be critically affected. (The theft and drug cases 
considered by the U.S. Supreme Court and cited herein are typical 
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of the kinds of prosecutions which may be impinged.) 
POINT XI 
THE COURT OF APPEAL HAS NO JURISDICTION 
TO REVIEW THE SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
OF THE TRIAL DE NOVO JUDGMENT. HOWEVER, 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENT AT 
TRIAL TO SUSTAIN THE CIRCUIT COURT JUDGMENT 
Appellee will not spend much space addressing 
Defendant/Appellant's argument that there was insufficient 
evidence presented at the trial de novo to sustain the judgment 
of the Circuit Court, Appellee has already emphasized its 
contention that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
in this case. Such argument obviously applies to a review of the 
sufficiency of the evidence below, since there is no statutory 
basis for such review and since it is clear from the statutes 
cited in Point I hereinabove that the legislature intended that 
the Circuit Court be the final Court of appeal from the Small 
Claims Court on all issues other than where a statute or 
ordinance is declared unconstitutional. 
As was stated in State v. Matus, 789 P.2d 304 (Utah App. 
1990) in the instance of an appeal in a criminal case: 
. • . once a justice court judgment is appealed to 
circuit court, Article I, Section 12 and Article VIII, 
Section 5 of the State Constitution do not entitle a 
disgruntled party to plenary review on the record of 
the circuit court's judgment in the do novo proceeding. 
Matus, supra, at p. 305. See also City of Monticello v. 
Christensen, 788 P.2d 513 (Utah 1990). 
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In any event, a review of the trial de novo transcript 
reveals that the required elements of the plaintiff's complaint 
were established by competent evidence; that is, that the vehicle 
in question was parked in violation of the City's ordinances and 
that Defendant/Appellant Leahy was the registered owner of that 
vehicle at the time of violation. Trial transcript, pages 5, 6. 
Defendant/Appellant Leahy failed to present any evidence 
contradicting the City's evidence and did not present evidence 
that he was not the person who had parked the vehicle. 
Therefore, viewing Section 12.56.530 as imposing either a common 
law or a statutory presumption that Leahy was the person who 
parked the vehicle, or viewing that ordinance as imposing strict 
and vicarious liability upon Leahy, there was sufficient evidence 
presented for the Court to find Leahy liable to the City. 
Likewise, the same evidence was sufficient under the overt strict 
liability ordinance, Section 12.56.560, to sustain the trial 
Court's j udgment. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court has no jurisdiction over the appeal in this 
instance, since (1) Appellant has not given notice of these 
proceedings to the Attorney General, (2) Appellant raises his 
challenge of the State statute for the first time on this appeal, 
and because (3) no State statute or local ordinance has been 
found to be unconstitutional as required by Section 78-6-10, Utah 
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Code Annotated 1953 as amended. Appellant's challenge to the 
constitutionality of the said State statute and to Salt Lake City 
Ordinances 12.56.530 and 12.56.560 must fail since Appellant has 
failed to meet his burden to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that said statute and ordinances are violative of any 
constitutional right to which Appellant is entitled. The 
challenged statute and ordinances are entitled to a presumption 
of constitutionality. They meet the constitutional requirements 
of due process, open access to the Courts, and equal protection 
of the laws. This Court should uphold the said statute and 
ordinances as being constitutional, and should find Appellant's 
appeal to be without basis. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 5~ day of A/OV£M&£j^ 
1992. 
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(t City Attorney 
Attorney for Appellee 
48 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing 
to the following, postage paid, this S~ day of /VOi/&M&€~*£ , 
1992: 
RONALD SCOTT LEAHY 
Appellant 
2273 Garfield Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
LVS:cc 
49 
